France · Next legislative election
577 races. One Assembly.
If the Assembly were dissolved today: a two-round Monte Carlo engine, transfers and withdrawals calibrated on the 1,646 runoffs of 2017-2024, anchored to the last direct legislative poll.
Estimated first-round vote intentions
Indirect estimate: last direct legislative poll October 2025 (5 anchor polls). Movement since then carried by presidential intentions (differential bridge), uncertainty ±3.2 pts.
The map, both rounds
The 11 overseas-French constituencies have no mappable territory: absent from the map, but present in the index and pages.
Three withdrawal scenarios
Republican front — 2024 level
Third-place withdrawals as in 2024: left 95%, centre 82%, right 28%.
45 %probability of an absolute RN majority
- RN and allies 285 [231–340]
- Left (NFP) 163 [123–203]
- Centre (Ensemble) 68 [36–103]
- LR and centre-right 48 [36–62]
Weakened front
Withdrawal probabilities halved — discipline erodes.
72 %probability of an absolute RN majority
- RN and allies 310 [260–359]
- Left (NFP) 157 [118–199]
- Centre (Ensemble) 55 [28–85]
- LR and centre-right 42 [32–54]
No front
Every qualifier stays in. Three-way runoffs everywhere.
90 %probability of an absolute RN majority
- RN and allies 335 [289–379]
- Left (NFP) 152 [113–193]
- Centre (Ensemble) 42 [21–66]
- LR and centre-right 37 [27–47]
Most contested constituencies
58 constituencies change winner depending on the front scenario. The 15 most uncertain (central scenario):
Browse all 577 constituencies →
- Essonne — 4ème circonscription p(win) 35 % flips across scenarios
- Côtes-d'Armor — 1ère circonscription p(win) 37 % flips across scenarios
- Doubs — 1ère circonscription p(win) 40 % flips across scenarios
- Finistère — 5ème circonscription p(win) 44 % flips across scenarios
- Seine-Maritime — 7ème circonscription p(win) 45 % flips across scenarios
- Nord — 4ème circonscription p(win) 46 % flips across scenarios
- Nord — 7ème circonscription p(win) 50 % flips across scenarios
- Maine-et-Loire — 4ème circonscription p(win) 50 % flips across scenarios
- Manche — 3ème circonscription p(win) 50 %
- Ariège — 2ème circonscription p(win) 50 %
- Calvados — 6ème circonscription p(win) 50 % flips across scenarios
- Val-de-Marne — 1ère circonscription p(win) 51 % flips across scenarios
- Ardèche — 3ème circonscription p(win) 52 %
- Maine-et-Loire — 7ème circonscription p(win) 52 % flips across scenarios
- Nord — 13ème circonscription p(win) 54 % flips across scenarios
How this projection is built
The problem: sparse polling
French legislative polls are event-driven — they only appear during crises. The last direct wave dates to September-October 2025 (five polls, three firms). Nothing since.
The differential bridge
The level starts from that October 2025 anchor. The movement comes from 2027 presidential intentions, measured continuously: we keep only the change, applied one-for-one (β = 1, imposed for lack of co-observation windows, but validated on those available). Uncertainty is ±3.2 points and grows as the anchor ages.
From votes to seats
The national result is Monte-Carlo simulated across all 577 constituencies with the real rules: qualification at 12.5% of registered voters, direct election at 50% of votes cast plus 25% of registered. Vote transfers are estimated by duel type over the 1,646 runoffs of 2017-2024, then reconciled (Bradley-Terry). Withdrawals are measured — in 2024, third-place candidates stood down 95% on the left, 82% in the centre, 28% on the right.
Three scenarios, not one certainty
Because the future level of withdrawals is unknowable, we bracket it in three republican-front scenarios rather than freezing one. The backtests justify it: 2022 lands at 7.4 seats of mean in-sample error, 2024 places the far right within ±3 seats — but transfers drift sharply from one election to the next.
What this projection is — and is not
- No direct legislative poll since October 2025: the level comes from that anchor, the movement from presidential polls (β=1, validated on the available co-observation windows).
- The first round applies the real qualification threshold (12.5% of registered voters); the runoff simulates transfers and withdrawals calibrated on 2017-2024.
- Future withdrawals are unknowable: each scenario is a conditional forecast, and together they define the range of plausible outcomes.
- Turnout assumed at the 2024 level (66.7%). Lower turnout means fewer three-way runoffs and a different map.
- Published backtests: 2022 (seat MAE 7.4 in-sample) and 2024 (far right within ±3 seats in-sample; left/centre residual documented).